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Did Public Wage Premiums Fuel Agglomeration in LDCs?
Abstract
We build and test a model of how the growth of public jobs with wage premiums may help to
explain the high and potentially inefficient level of urbanization in LDCs. Public jobs comprise
about 40% of non-agricultural employment in LDCs, and have frequently offered substantial wage
premiums. The Harris-Todaro model - and its extensions- suggest that wage premiums induce
inefficient agglomeration, but that model critically assumes that wage premium jobs are allocated to
favor local residents. This is inapplicable to public appointments in various LDCs. In the two-region
general equilibrium model discussed here, the existence of spatial mobility costs are shown to be
sufficient for wage premiums to result in inefficient agglomeration in regions that are allocated
wage premium jobs. This weakens the assumptions under which wage premiums promote
agglomeration, and extends the idea to LDCs such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya, where public
jobs have, until recent reforms, offered substantial wage premiums, but are not allocated so as to
favor local residents. The policy implications of this model also differ from Harris-Todaro. For
example, if wage premiums are later reduced, the agglomeration persists: with mobility costs, the
history of the location of jobs with wage premiums matters.  We explore our hypothesis using
Egyptian data.  Between 1960 and 1986 the share of public jobs increased from 10% to 34% of the
labor force, public jobs were centrally allocated, and offered a high total compensation premium.
We find that public jobs’ growth has substantially altered the pattern of regional mobility and
population shares, in a way that is consistent with this theory of agglomeration due to wage
premiums and mobility friction.
JEL classification: J61, J68, J60, J45, H11 & H40
Keywords: Public sector, agglomeration, migration, & developing country.1.  Introduction
What explains the high levels of urbanization that, in only a few decades, became
commonplace in LDCs? Whereas studies of the share of urban employment in nineteenth century
Europe emphasize the growth of spatially concentrated labor demand arising from the exploitation
of economies of scale in new manufacturing technologies, and an accommodating rural labor supply
– for example, Mathias (1969) - the consensus explanation of urbanization in contemporary LDCs
has a different focus. Urbanization in LDCs is conventionally viewed as the result of high aggregate
population growth, with rural labor overflowing into urban areas- for example, Williamson(1982)
and Lucas(1997)- with comparatively little emphasis on increases in urban labor demand. A feature
of LDCs that has been widely thought to reinforce this supply-side explanation of urbanization, is
an artificially high wage in some urban sectors. This idea is associated with Harris-Todaro (1970)
and its’ extensions. However, empirical tests of this model of inefficient concentration have proved
at best inconclusive, so that the influence of wage premiums on urban growth remains unsettled.
1
 The purpose of this paper is to present and test a different model of how wage premiums
promote inefficient spatial concentration. This model focuses on the interaction between wage
premiums and mobility costs. Since our concern is with the growth of cities in LDCs we attach the
argument to the implications of public wage premiums, but discuss below how the basic mechanism
can generate inefficient concentration when wage premiums are set by other institutions such as
unions. Public jobs provide the focus because of their recent importance in the provision of wage
premium jobs in LDCs: a large proportion of non–farm jobs in LDCs are provided in the public
sector
2, and country-level studies often find that public employees receive large wage premiums.
3

1 For example, Williamson (1982) concludes that empirical work does not support the Harris-Todaro approach, whereas
Lucas (1988) reaches a more open-minded view.
2 For example, van Ginneken (1990) and World Development Report (1995).  Public employment in LDCs grew rapidly
for two decades from the 1960s and by the mid 1980s averaged 44% of non-agriculture employment in a survey of
LDCs – Heller & Tait  (1983).
3 A useful survey is produced in the World Development Report (1995) and Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997). Recent
evidence of Sri Lanka – Rama (1999) – suggests that substantial premiums of the order of 60% in public pay continue
to exist in some LDCs.  Structural reforms have recently reduced wage premiums in some countries. In many LDCs, the
total compensation premium exceeds the wage premium because of the existence of health, pension and social security
benefits. Much of the evidence that wage premiums are paid in LDCs comes from studies of public wage premiums.￿
Thus any theory and empirical test of the implications of wage premiums in LDCs needs to be
consistent with the working of the public sector and its’ consequences for concentration.
4
 In Harris and Todaro (1970) wage premiums cause inefficient employment concentration
because living near to wage premium jobs is conjectured to increase the probability of a wage
premium job offer. Thus, workers have an incentive to distort their location choice and accept a
relatively low wage near to wage premium jobs. However, although this model is applied
indiscriminately to all wage premium jobs, in many countries it is not applicable to public wage
premiums.  This is because the public appointments system – frequently centralized so that the
dispensation of patronage meets the objectives of national government - does not give a search
advantage to locating near public jobs. The model in Section II of how wage premiums inefficiently
concentrate employment requires weaker assumptions than the Harris-Todaro model, and extends
the idea that wage premiums cause agglomeration to LDCs such as Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya,
5
where public jobs are not allocated to favor local residents. It provides empirical predictions that are
tested against (i) two explanations of how public jobs efficiently influence urban employment
growth, and (ii) the Harris-Todaro model of inefficient urban growth.
6
We analyze a general equilibrium model with two regions and two goods that is a
development from Roback (1982). In keeping with the marginal role of local government in many
LDCs, central government is assumed to allocate public jobs to each region. Public sector workers
receive a wage premium and produce a local public good that may influence individual utility and
firms’ costs. Unlike Roback’s model, the local public good is impure, and services diminish with
total local employment. The degree of dilution of the impure local public good is used to replace
land prices as an equilibriating mechanism. We do this in order to simplify the analysis and focus
on the relationship between wage premiums and mobility costs. Central Government levies an

4 See the survey of agglomeration by Fujita and Thisse (1996), which points to the absence of the role of government
production in studies of employment concentration.  There are, of course, several other models of urban concentration
in LDCs – for example, Krugman and Elizondo (1992) in which protectionism increases this incentive to locate near to
domestic suppliers and the size of cities.
5 See Krishnan et al. (1998) for details on Ethiopia and Milne and Neitzert (1996) on Kenya.
6 Lucas (1997) provides a valuable survey of empirical analysis of the Harris-Todaro model.￿
economy-wide income tax to pay public wages Competitive firms produce a traded good, and
choose employment to maximize profit. Workers choose where to locate, given local wages and
public services, and buy goods out of income net of mobility costs.
7
If migration is costless, a regional allocation of public jobs causes net - migration (which
may be positive or negative according to whether the productivity of public jobs exceeds the
incremental local congestion that more public workers generate), and under certain assumptions
does not change local wages. The change in total regional employment provides a compensating
change in the provision of impure regional public services. Additional public jobs cause total
employment in the recipient region to increase if, and only if, public jobs are at least slightly
productive. Crucially, wage premiums do not affect the equilibrium.
If migration is costly there exist a continuum of equilibria, and allocating public jobs with
wage premiums to a region will increase total employment in the recipient region, even if public
jobs are unproductive (sinecures). Why is this? An urban allocation of sinecures will induce those
living elsewhere who do not have such a job, to accept any offer and migrate, provided the wage
premium exceeds migration costs. The resulting increase in urban congestion reduces urban private
labor demand and relative urban wages until at a critical relative wage, determined by mobility
costs and the initial equilibrium, offsetting out-migration begins. Mobility costs create a friction that
limits out-migration from the urban area below the in-migration that is funded by the increase in
wage premium jobs. Out-migration is only fully offsetting if the initial equilibrium is a corner point
at which relative urban wages are initially at a low level. Wage premiums induce inefficient
migration that could be eliminated if private sector urban workers may ‘purchase’ wage premium
jobs from those rural workers who have received an offer. In practice workers holding offers do not
have these property rights. The policy implications of this model differ from those of the Harris-
Todaro model. In this model, i) structural reforms that layoff urban public workers, or reduce the

7 Mobility costs arise not only in separating from family and the physical costs of moving, but also when leaving an
urban area, in the loss of variety of consumption goods, learning externalities from skilled workers, and access to public
services. These are unlikely to be viewed as unimportant, and perhaps help to explain why those migrating from the
major cities of Egypt- Cairo and Alexandria- migrate only short distances.￿
public wage premium, do not necessarily reduce the urban labor force, and ii) allocating urban jobs
with wage premiums directly to rural applicants will increase the equilibrium labor force.
 At least two arguments in the literature link public jobs and ‘over- urbanization’. One
school of thought has argued that too many public jobs have been located in urban areas - for
example, Lipton (1977) – and another that the (urban) public sectors may have become too large –
for example Keyfitz (1982) - but these conjectures are not pursued here.
8 These studies give
political economy reasons for both the urban bias to public services and high public pay, and add a
theory – usually Harris-Todaro – of household location, for example, Lipton (1977), Gelb, Knight,
and Sabot (1991), and Keyfitz (1982).
9 However, the resulting partial equilibrium arguments do not
explain, for example, how public jobs and services influence private labor demand at each location.
Thus it is unclear whether a regional allocation of local public goods will in equilibrium be offset
by a compensating regional wage differential or attract in-migration to reduce the public service.
An exception is Ades and Glaeser (1995) who develop a political economy model of regional
taxation in which dictatorial regimes choose lower urban relative to rural taxes than democratic
regimes, and thereby stimulate city growth.  Although public wage premiums and urban bias to
public jobs are not discussed, these authors’ framework explains one form of urban fiscal bias, and
provides a way to explain an urban bias to public jobs.  Rather than take this path, the intuition for
which appears largely worked-out, we instead take the location and high pay of public jobs as
exogenous, and explore a new model of their consequences for total urban employment.
Unfortunately there is no directly relevant econometric evidence
10 that public jobs
subsequently influence the spatial location of economic activity in LDCs.  However, analysis of the

8 Large public sectors may be the efficient response to twentieth century technologies in health care and education, and
insofar as public goods are efficiently supplied in spatially discrete amounts, the urban locations of public jobs may
have been efficient.
9 The economic geography models of urban areas and development – for example, Henderson (1988), Krugman (1991),
and Krugman and Elizondo (1992), Black and Henderson (1997), and summarised by Fujita and Thisse (1996) – have
yet to incorporate location distortions resulting from government policy.
10 Wheaton and Shishido (1981) provide interesting aggregate cross-section evidence concerning the influence of the
public sector on agglomeration, but are not concerned to analyse the allocational implications of government policy in
the way adopted here.  Various studies for developed countries are relevant, including empirical analysis of regional
climatological amenities and for crime and air quality amenities are available for developed countries, for example
Graves (1979) and Roback (1982).  For developing countries perhaps the most relevant work is Rosenzweig and￿
influence of defense expenditure on US regional employment – for example, Markusen et al. (1991)
– and less directly, that of provincial tax and expenditure policies on inter-provincial migration in
Canada – Day (1992) – suggest that these effects could be substantial.
The theory of how wage premiums inefficiently influence migration and employment
concentration is developed in Section 2.  Since the hypothesis proposes a specific micro influence
upon agglomeration, it appears more instructive to test against the alternatives by examining a
single economy in detail rather than, for example, urbanization in cross-country relationships.
Sections 3 & 4 describe a case study of Egypt, 1960-1988,where public jobs offered a high total
compensation premium, and their share in employment increased from 10 to 35%. Section 3
provides empirical analysis using individual and regional data, of whether a provincial allocation of
public jobs subsequently influences provincial total employment, and Section 4 describes the
empirical tests of our explanation of why this occurs.
2.   A Model of Public Jobs, Wage Premiums and Agglomeration
In this economy a unitary government reserves the power to make regional appointments to
public office, and offers public jobs with wage premiums to selected workers. We focus on how a
central government decision to increase a regional allocation of public jobs offering wage
premiums, will influence total regional employment – and thus the endogenous provision of public
services – and unregulated regional wages. A private good and a local impure public good are
produced in each of two featureless regions,
11 rural (R) and urban (U).
(i) The Supply of Public Goods.  The government allocates G
U public jobs to urban areas,
and G
R to rural areas.  These employees produce  ) , ( R U j G
j j = a units of public goods per period
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Wolpin (1988) who explore the effects of a child health care programme in a Colambian village on the selectivity of
migrants from nearby villages.  Krugman (1998) points out the limited advances made by computable geographic
equilibrium models owing to the difficulties of calibration to actual data.￿
] , [ a ae o .  The productivity of government jobs, a
j, may vary between regions.  The public goods
are impure so that an increase in the region’s population, 
j j L G + , negatively influences the
services provided by the public goods – for example, roads become crowded.  Since the regional
allocation of private jobs, 
j L , is endogenous, the services provided by regional public goods f
j is
also endogenous and given by
) , ( 0 , 0 ) , ( 2 1 U R j L G G
j j j j j = £ ³ + = f f a f f
     (1)    
An increase in 
j G increases the supply of public goods, provided a
j > 0, but also increases
congestion.  Thus an increase in government jobs to a region has an ambiguous effect on the supply
of public services,  0 /
>
< dG df . The public good is local so that firms and households in region j(j =
U,R) benefit only from public goods produced in region j.
(ii) Firms produce output with labor and capital, K, in a constant returns to scale technology,
) , ( 0 , ) , ( U R j F F K L F y K L
j j j j = ³ =f (2)
and local public services influence total factor productivity.  Capital is traded at an exogenous world
price r.  Given constant returns to scale, firms minimize unit cost, which in equilibrium is equal to
the unit price.  Thus from (2) for a Cobb-Douglas production function, if firms may freely enter or
leave each region, employment in each region is given by
a a a f
- = +
1 ) ( ) , ( r w L G G
U U U U U                (3a)
a a a f
- = - -
1 ) ( ) , ( r w L G L G
R U U R R              (3b)                            
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
11 There is apparently no loss of generality by having only two regions.  These regions might be labelled A and B since
there is no intrinsic difference between them in the model.  However the discussion of how increments to one region’s
allocation of public jobs is made somewhat more realistic by referring to the recipient region as “urban”.￿
where we have used the total employment constraint, 
U U R R G L G L L + + + = , in (3b).  If L
U is
such that the LHS of (3a) exceeds the RHS, then urban congestion is sufficiently low that urban
firms can increase employment.  An equivalent argument applies to rural areas in (3b).  Equations
(3a) and (3b) may be combined to define the equilibrium relationship between the relative regional
wage and the demand for urban labor, L
U, both of which are endogenous. Thus
) , , , ; (
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When relative urban wages are high, urban private employment is low, ceteris paribus, since
with less urban employment congestion is also lower, which increases the local public services
received by firms enabling a higher wage to be paid.  The properties of (3c) are straightforward: an
increase in G
U, will increase urban private employment, L
U, provided a
U exceeds a critical value, so
that the increase in urban public services outweighs the effect of an increase in relative urban
congestion.  Conversely for an increase in G
R.  An increase in urban public worker efficiency, a
U,
will enhance public services and unambiguously increase L
U.  The demand for urban employment,
given the relative urban wage, is described by ll in Figure 1.
(iii) Workers are homogenous and supply one unit of labor.  The public net wage is w ; private
sector workers in region j earn gross wage w
j.  Workers choose location to maximize utility, V, with
the consumption of private goods and local impure public goods as arguments.  Since the price of
private goods is one, private consumption is income net of taxes and mobility costs.  Mobility costs
are assumed to be predominantly time costs and a migrant’s wage net of these costs is proportionate
to the wage at destination.  Thus in region j a migrant earns mw
j where m<1 for migrants and m=1
for non-migrants.  Thus utility for private workers in  j, V, is￿
) , ( 0 , )) , ( ); ( ( 2 , 1 R U j V V L G G t l mw V V
j j j j j = > + - = a f                 (4)
(iv) The government wage bill is financed by a proportionate income tax, t.  Thus the government
budget constraint is given by
                                         
j j
R U j




) (                                (5)
(v) Equilibrium without mobility costs, m = 1.  Definition:  The economy is in equilibrium if, given
government policy variables  ) , , , ( t G G w
R U  workers have no incentive to migrate, firms have unit
costs, and the government has a balanced budget.  At the beginning of each period the Government
allocates 
j G jobs to region j, and sets the government wage, w , net of tax.  Government jobs are
allocated to certain workers, and all accept, if necessary migrating, since by assumption
j t w w m
j " - > ) 1 ( .  Utility of workers in private jobs is equalized between regions if,
)) , ( ); ( (
U U R R R L G L G t l w V - - - a f          
                                                 )) , ( ); 1 ( (
U U U U U L G G t w V + - = a f (6)
Firms have unit costs if (3a) and (3b) hold.  The government budget constraint is given by (5).  We
may solve (6) (3a) (3b) and (5) for (L
U, w
U, w
R, t), conditional upon 
R U G G w , , .  Since public
services in each region determine regional wages offered by firms in (3a) and (3b), we may
substitute f out of (6).  If utility, V, is Cobb-Douglas, 
c j c j t w V
- - =
1 ) ( )) 1 ( f , the income tax, t, can
be eliminated from (6), and using (3a) and (3b) in (6), gives
                                                                
R U w w =           (7)




be found from (6) (3a) (3b), and are independent of t.  Thus the government can vary t to ensure that
tax revenue equals the public wage bill,  ) (
R U G G w + , without changing the private sector
equilibrium  }. , ) {( R U j L w
j j =
 12  Using (7) to substitute (w
U/w
R) from (3c) gives L
U, as a function
only of public service provision,  ) , ( R U j G
j j = a .  Thus we have,
PROPOSITION 1.  If regional mobility is free (m=1) and utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of
public and private goods (i) regional wage rates are equal, regardless of the allocation of public
jobs, (ii) urban private employment, L
U, is determined by the allocations of public jobs (G
U,G
R),
and their productivity, a
U and a
R, (iii) the properties of L
U, from (3c) and (7) are:
) , , , , 1 (
R U R U U G G L L a a =   (8)




















and, (iv) if urban public jobs are unproductive, then from (3c) and (7), dL
U/dG
U = -1, so that urban
sinecures crowd out an equal number of private jobs.
Proposition 1 gives assumptions under which an allocation of public jobs to a region, funded
by a national income tax, will be offset by in-migration which changes impure public good
provision, rather than by a compensating change in regional wages.  The intuition is that regional
change household utility and firms’ profits in the same direction - both are increased by local public
services, 
U f . In-migration restores the regional equilibrium by diluting public service quality,
thereby reducing profits and utility relative to that elsewhere.  In contrast, a change in relative

12 From the tax function (5), tax revenues are a monotone increasing function of t, so that there is a unique value of t
that balances the budget.￿
￿
￿
wages cannot restore equilibrium because to offset the effect of more regional public services,
workers require a regional wage cut, whereas firms require a wage increase.
13, 
14
The ambiguity of dL
U/dG
U arises because more public jobs increase both public services and
congestion, as discussed above for (3c): if a
U falls below a critical level then the congestion, created
by new public jobs is sufficient to reduce the regional demand for labor.  Since regional supply is
perfectly elastic at unchanged wages, this causes out-migration from the region with more public
jobs.  The intuition for (iv) is similar to that for (i).  Urban sinecures, if partially filled by rural
migrants, create urban congestion and reduce rural congestion.  This reduces urban firms’
productivity and urban workers utility, and has a converse outcome in rural areas.  To raise both
urban utility and productivity, the level of public services must increase, since the alternative of a
regional wage change will have opposite effects on profits and utility.  To increase urban public
services, private urban employment is reduced until the urban congestion from the additional public
jobs is unpacked.  This returns total urban employment to its original level.  A regional allocation of
public jobs will not change total regional employment if public jobs are unproductive, but given
dL
U/da
U > 0 will increase total regional employment provided public jobs are slightly productive.






















































































13 Thus in our model the land market is not modelled. However this would not appear to alter the basic intuition
provided by this model, if land is introduced, increased public employment continues to attract migrants to clear
markets but land prices also bear the incidence of more local private employment.  The way in which wage premiums
foster agglomeration when there exist mobility costs would not appear to be sensitive to using the degree of impurity of
public goods, rather than land prices, as the equilibrating mechanism.
14 Departures from the Social Optimum: A Further Result.  If policy variables are initially at a welfare maximizing
level, then a small increase in G
U funded by an increase in the economy wide tax, t, will increase L
U for all positive a
U.
To see this, consider a welfare optimum.  There are diseconomies in the supply of impure public goods from
concentrating total public employment in one of the two identical regions.  Thus a welfare maximizing government will
support two symmetric regional economies and set a) identical government employment and income tax rates to achieve
a Samuelson first-best in each region; and b) government wages equal to private wages.  This gives a distortion free
economy.  Consider now a marginal increase in G
U financed by increased federal income tax, t.  We found that
increasing t does not alter L
U, thus the only effect on L
U arises from the increase in G
U funded by an economy-wide tax,







































































Using (3a) and (3b) to eliminate  ) / (
U R f f , workers migrate to private urban jobs if
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d   Conversely workers migrate to private rural jobs if






                       (10)
Thus the urban private sector labor supply is (a) inelastic between 
d m and 
d - m at the level
determined in the previous period net of quits to the public wage premium jobs, and (b) infinitely
elastic at 
d - m and 
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U CTGC Points on the urban labor demand schedule ll where
relative urban wages either exceed 
d - m or are less than 
d m , are not equilibria since workers will
migrate to or from the urban area.
PROPOSITION 2. An allocation of public jobs with wage premiums to urban areas will increase
total urban employment, even if public jobs are unproductive, provided i) mobility costs are positive
but less than the wage premium, ii) some of the public jobs are offered to rural workers and iii) the
initial equilibrium is not one of the corner solutions.j
￿
k
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows.  Suppose urban public jobs with a wage premium are
offered to rural workers, who accept and migrate, and assume initially that these jobs are sinecures.
This increases urban congestion, and reduces urban employee utility.  In the absence of mobility
costs this prompts migration to private rural jobs equal to migration to public urban jobs, since this
restores the original level of congestion, (Proposition 1 (iv)).  However, mobility costs diminish this
offsetting flow.  This is because the regional utility differential between private jobs declines to zero
if migration is fully offsetting, but migration costs are finite and thus prevent a full offset.  If the
additional public jobs are not sinecures (a
U>0) then the extra public goods provided reinforce the
agglomeration effect of mobility costs, by reducing offsetting migration from urban areas.
Total urban employment increases because the high wage urban jobs are partly filled by
rural workers who pay migration costs to secure a wage premium.  Wage premiums are not pure
rents, and instead induce workers with costs of taking-up a job to relocate.  Efficient migration and
urban employment requires that following an increase in urban public employment, rural-urban
migration only occurs when urban private wages net of mobility costs exceed rural wages mw
U>w
R.
Without wage premiums this is exactly what happens.  With wage premiums, this condition is
sufficient to prompt rural-urban migration, but not necessary since 
U w w >  which increases the
incentive to migrate.  Thus, socially excessive migration and urban employment result.  What are
the policy implications?
To demonstrate Proposition 2, consider an increase in urban public jobs, G
U. Assume a
fraction b of these urban public jobs are allocated to rural workers, and (1 - b) to urban workers.
The equilibrium conditions are (3c), (9), (10) and the previous urban employment level minus
U G ) 1 ( b - . The migration conditions (9) and (10) are unaffected, but urban labor demand, (3c), is
changed.  From equation (3c) the change in urban labor demand is given by
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a                          (11)
This gives the horizontal movement of ll in Figure 2.  Consider an arbitrary previous period
equilibrium, h, at which urban private employment is 
U L2 .  We first discuss the case a
U= 0, and then
show that if a
U> 0 the agglomeration effect is strengthened.  If a
U= 0,  from (11),  dL
U/dG
U = -1,
so that in Fig 2, ll shifts to the left by the increase in G
U. For simplicity of notation, set dG
U= A, so
that ll shifts to the left by A, to l0l0.  If labor demand is l0l0, the critical level of private urban labor
supply that triggers urban-rural migration is 
U L2 . Prior to any urban-rural migration, the supply of
urban workers to the private urban sector is reduced to  A L
U ) 1 ( 1 b - - .
There are two cases to consider: (i) If  A L
U ) 1 ( 1 b - -  is greater than 
U L2  ( as it is drawn in
Figure 2), then this cannot be an equilibrium urban private labor supply since the relative urban
wage ( at  1 e ) is below m
d so that migration occurs.  Thus urban private labor supply is at most,
U L2 Since the wage at all initial equilibria, except n, is above m
d, the wage at 
U L2 , then  A L L
U U < - 2 1 ,
provided the initial equilibrium is not the corner point n.  Thus total urban employment is increased.
(ii) If  A L
U ) 1 ( 1 b - -  is less than 
U L2 , then no migration to private jobs occurs.  In this case urban
private labor supply has fallen by  A ) 1 ( b - which is less than A, since b > 0.  In both the case with
and without migration, private employment declines by less than the increase in public jobs,
provided the initial equilibrium is not n, and b > 0.  If the initial equilibrium is n, the urban wage
cannot be driven lower to offset public service reduction from incremental government jobs, so that
public jobs fully “crowd out” private jobs. If a
U > 0, then from the second term of the RHS of
(11), the demand for urban labor is higher than in the previous analysis, and potentially to the right,
of its initial position, ll.  This may only reduce any urban to rural migration and thereby increase the
total urban employment that results from the increase in urban public jobs.
The implications of a change inb , the fraction of urban public jobs given to rural workers.n
p
o
An increase in b shifts the vertical segment of the urban labor supply curve to the right, since
following an allocation of urban public jobs, fewer workers leave the urban private sector for public
jobs. From (3c), urban labor demand is unchanged. This increases equilibrium urban employment,
unless prior to the increase in b , equilibrium employment required urban to rural migration, as in
2 2l l , Figure 1. Intuitively, the greater is b , the greater is migration from rural areas to accept a
given increase in urban public jobs, A. This is only fully offset by greater urban-rural migration if
the equilibrium is initially at the low relative wage m
d, on the elastic section of the urban labor
supply curve. Thus an increase in b  will either leave unchanged or increase total urban
employment. Fields (1975) carefully shows how the Harris–Todaro model predicts the opposite
outcome.
PROPOSITION 3.  If an allocation of urban public jobs with wage premiums has caused total
urban employment to increase, subsequent structural reform to reduce either (i) the size of the wage
premium, or (ii) the number of urban public sinecures, will not reduce total urban employment.
The intuition is as follows.  A lower public wage premium, by itself, alters nothing once the
original addition to public jobs has occurred. Public employees may consider that their wage is no
longer sufficient to cover sunk migration costs, but no reallocations occur. Suppose holders of urban
sinecures are fired and that some of these migrate. Public output is unaltered, but a smaller urban
population reduces urban congestion, thereby increasing private labor demand and (w
U/w
R). This
attracts in-migrants. This continues until urban private employment is increased sufficiently to
absorb all the laid-off workers with relative private wages and total regional employment
unchanged.
To demonstrate Proposition 3, suppose that structural reforms reduce G
U by A unproductive
jobs.  The migration conditions (9) and (10) are unaffected, but equation (3c), the urban demand for
labor is changed.  Using (3c) to derive (11), and since a
U = 0, the private demand for urban labor is
now increased by A.  This is because there are fewer sinecures, which reduces urban congestion,q
Z
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and increases private labor productivity by this amount.  (Shifting l0l0 to the right by A.)  Given
mobility costs, the supply of labor to the urban private sector is increased by the A displaced
workers.  Thus the urban private sector can absorb all the displaced public workers, with no change
in relative wages.  Total urban labor employment is thus unaffected.  The asymmetry of response of
total urban employment to positive and negative changes in G
U arises because some of the
additional urban public jobs are offered to rural workers who migrate, given that wage premiums
exceed mobility costs.  In contrast, reductions in public jobs do not create an offsetting reduction in
urban labor supply since displaced urban public workers are not offered rural jobs with premiums,
and in the presence of mobility costs remain in the urban sector.
3.  Do Public Jobs Influence the Spatial Allocation of Employment?
The primary empirical implication of the model in Section 2 is that, if there exist mobility
costs, regions allocated centrally funded public jobs with wage premiums will experience socially
inefficient in-migration, and an increase in total employment.  This occurs even if wage premium
jobs provide no local services, which would attract immigrants in a conventional way.  What is the
key intuition?  Extra wage premium jobs in region A provide workers elsewhere with an incentive
to migrate, even if individual productivity is not increased.  This is inefficient because mobility is
costly.  As region A is now more congested, workers without wage premium jobs will have lower
utility.  In the absence of mobility costs, migration from A occurs until employment is reduced to its
original level; with mobility costs, migration from A is insufficient to restore either the original
utility in A, or to reduce employment to the initial level.  Thus, under weak assumptions, inefficient
migration and agglomeration may occur due to wage premiums: even if jobs are allocated so as not
to distort the applicant's location choice, the wage premiums distort the workplace location choice.
This section provides a case study of employment location and public jobs in Egypt, where
an expanding public sector, 1960-1990, with a centralized system of appointments, paid substantials
Z
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wage premiums.  An overview of public jobs in Egypt, focusing on their location, compensation
premiums, and methods of appointment, is provided in the Appendix.
We first discuss whether Egyptian public jobs growth has subsequently influenced the
spatial allocation of employment.  After giving supporting evidence, we then test our explanation of
this against the alternatives in Section 4.  To study whether public jobs location has subsequently
altered the spatial distribution of employment, we examine the impact of public jobs on (i) inter-
provincial migration, and (ii) the provincial evolution of population shares, 1976-1996.
i) Do governorates with public employment growth attract migrants?
An implication of the hypothesis is that workers are attracted into governorates (provinces)
with public jobs growth. To study mobility we use the 1988 Labor Force Survey
15 that samples
approximately 10,000 individuals. The Survey reports residential and work locations at the time of
the survey and retrospective information concerning October 1981.
16   Respondents were classed as
migrants if their employment location in 1988 was in a different governorate to that in 1981.  There
are 26 governorates (provinces) in Egypt, and these are sub-divisions of the six regions, listed in
Table 1B.  The analysis concerns male labor force participants, aged 15-64.
Migration rates by characteristic are shown in Table 2A, together with the distribution of
characteristics amongst migrants and those of the total sample.  About 10% of our sample migrated
over the preceding seven years.  Migration rates are high amongst those who in 1981 worked in
Greater Cairo and low amongst those who worked in Upper (i.e. South) Egypt; rates are also higher
amongst the educated.  As in most other studies, migration rates increase with education, and
generally decline with age, although the youngest workers have low migration rates.  Columns 2

15 The survey was carried out by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).




and 3 contrast the characteristics of migrants to public and private sector jobs.  Migrants working in
public jobs, tend to be older and to have higher than average education.
Our hypothesis requires that a substantial flow of migration to public jobs arises from
workers formerly in the private sector.  From Table 2B we find that of the 186 migrants to public
jobs, 80 (43%) originated in the private sector.  Furthermore, of the 1329 workers in public jobs in
1988, 6.02% had migrated between governorates in the previous seven years, having previously
held private sector positions.  We also find that migration to public jobs, 1981-88, is
disproportionately large relative to the share of public jobs in the economy; whereas 32% of
workers were employed in public jobs, 42.8% of all migration is to public jobs.
To study whether public jobs growth influences provincial migration, we estimate, for three
educational groups, a binomial logit model of the probability of migrating between governorates
(provinces), 1981-88.  Our hypothesis is that governorates with public jobs growth attract migrants
into public jobs, and so we next estimate a trinomial logit that distinguishes between the
determinants of migration to accept public and private jobs, relative to not migrating.  Thus, we
assume that the probability that an individual of category i from governorate j makes choice k may
be described as a logistic function:
Prob . 2 1 , 0 )] ( exp 1 /[ ) exp( ) (
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In both models the reference category (k = 0) is non-migration.  In the trinomial model k = 1 is
migrating to a public sector job; k = 2 is migrating to a private sector job.  The explanatory
variables comprise both provincial level and individual variables that normally enter migration
models, and also additional variables capturing: (i) the influence of wage premium jobs on
migration, and (ii) the provision of local public services.  These variables are now discussed.
Public sector employment.  First, we allow for the possibility that certain public employees produce
local public goods or subsidized services.  The level of these services influences utility, and fromw
y
x
the analysis in Section 2 we expect that shocks which reduce local public service provision will
induce out-migration.
17  To capture this effect we use the change in the level of public service jobs
divided by total employment in the origin governorate,  ) / (
i i N j D .
Secondly, we have modeled in Section 2 how wage premiums may prompt migration.  To
derive an econometric specification we must be more specific about public appointments.  We
assume that during each period a fraction of public jobs turnover, but that public workers cannot
anticipate which.  Thus each period all workers apply for a public job.
18  The probability that an
individual in education group i receives a public sector job offer is given by 
i i E Q / , where 
i Q is the
number of positions created over a given period, and 
i E is the number of workers without public
jobs in education category i.  In our model all successful applicants accept public sector jobs
regardless of location since  ) , ( R U j w w m
j = > .  Now consider a worker living in governorate j.  If
the number of public sector jobs created in other governorates is 
i
j Q~ , and governorate of residence
does not influence where an offer is located,
19 then the probability that an individual in educational
category i migrates to a public sector job is given by
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The denominator, 
i E , is independent of j.  Thus, in a model of migration within educational
category i we conjecture that the probability of migration to public sector jobs is positively
influenced by provincial variations in 
i
j Q~ , the increase of public sector jobs located in





j G~ D .

17 We have also used a regional human development index based on components such as life expectancy and literacy
which might be thought to reflect the consequences of public service outputs.  This index gives similar conclusions to
the variable reported.
18 These jobs may produce local public goods or be sinecures but all offer the same high compensation.
19 This specification of the allocation of public jobs is reinforced by the procedure whereby public jobs are allocated by
a central government agency, such as that in Egypt, which minimizes the influence of residential location on job offers.z
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The two public job variables  ) / ( {
i i N j D  and  } ~
i
j G D  are thought of as determining the
migration flows created by shocks to the levels of G
U and G
R in our equilibrium model in Section 2.
The first variable captures changes in provision of local public goods, and the latter an uneven
geographic distribution of new jobs with wage premiums.  In our model wages are endogenous and
thus in our preferred empirical models we exclude relative provincial wages from the list of
regressors.  Relative provincial unemployment rates may similarly be thought of as endogenous
with respect to government job creation and are excluded from our preferred models.  Public Sector
Employees may experience different migration propensities.  Since less educated public employees
frequently hold short-term contracts, we allow illiterate public employees to have a separate
influence.  We also allow for the following familiar influences.
Age: Many studies have confirmed the conjecture that the probability of a move decreases with age
– for example, Mazmundar (1987).  The influence of age is examined using six age groups: 15-21,
22-26, 27-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64.
Education:  The propensity to migrate is generally found to be higher for the more educated.  In
addition, a few studies find that the more educated are more sensitive to economic variables
affecting mobility, for example, Fields (1982), Schultz (1982) and Levy and Wadycki (1974).
20  We
distinguish three education groups: illiterates; literate, but less than secondary schooling and
university graduates.
Cost of living:  Regional differences in cost of living are captured by six regional fixed effects:
Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Canal Cities, Lower and Upper Urban, Lower and Upper Rural.

20 A one per cent increase in local wage rates reduces the migration rate by only 0.3 per cent for the uneducated and by
1.7 per cent for those with secondary education.  They argue that education clearly increases information directly and
reduces the cost of obtaining more information.  Thus, the educated tend to be much more responsive to wage and
income opportunities than are the uneducated.  Fields (1982) in his study of Colombia finds that the better educated
groups exhibit more responsiveness to differences in income as shown by the higher coefficient of origin and
destination income in the macro migration function.  Similar results are obtained by Schultz (1982) in his work on
macro-migration in Venezuela using separate regressions for different educational groups.  He finds that the destination
employment conditions are statistically significant only for the secondary and higher educational group.  For the less
educated groups the traditional wage gap appears to be the predominant determinant of interregional migration.  Levy|
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Industry:  Evidence from Table 2A, shows that the agricultural sector contains 34% of the total
sample, but only 18% of the migrants.  One reason may be that the experience gained in agriculture
usually has little value elsewhere.  Table 2A shows that only 6% of the total sample are employed
in the construction sector compared to 17% of migrants, perhaps as a result of the spatially
fluctuating nature of construction demand.
21  Thus, four private industry effects are used:
agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services.
Relative provincial (governorate) wage and unemployment rates traditionally play a central role in
empirical migration analysis where migration is modelled as arising from spatial differences in
utility levels, which are usually captured by relative wage and unemployment rates.  In the model in
Section 2 wages are endogenous so that in our preferred model we exclude familiar measure of
labor market tightness, and use shocks to the government employment variables, described above,
as the appropriate exogenous regressors.
22
Results:  Table 4 gives estimates of binary logit models of the probability of migration.  Columns 1,
3, and 5 show the full model for the three types of workers, while columns 2, 4, and 6 give the
parsimonious version where insignificant variables have been deleted.  The parameter estimates in
Table 4 suggest that the geographic distribution of incremental public sector employment has a
highly significant influence on migration, except for illiterate workers, where the effect is
economically meaningful but poorly determined.  The more public jobs that are created outside a
given governorate in the period 1981-88, within an educational category, the higher is the
probability of out-migration, ceteris paribus.  This confirms the prediction that increases in the
relative size of the public sector in governorate j, results in greater in-migration flows.  We could
not, however, uncover a significant effect for any educational group of the change in the public
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
and Wadycki (1974) study interstate migration rates in Venezuela, and they find that the wage elasticity of migration
increases sharply with education.
21 Similar patterns have been found in developed countries – for example, the UK, where construction and service
workers are found to be more likely to move than other workers, ceteris paribus.~
￿
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services variable;  ) / (
i i N j D .  (We have also used a provincial development index, but this too
gives insignificant results.)  The primary impact of public jobs on migration would appear to be as a
source of high compensation employment rather than through local public goods provision.
The parameter estimates for other variables support the specification.  For the less educated,
the probability of migration peaks among those aged 22-26, and for the educated, slightly later, i.e.
among those aged 27-34.  Amongst the less educated, workers engaged in agriculture, are less prone
to migrate – as found by Tunali (1996) – while construction workers are more likely to move.  Also,
the estimates show that amongst illiterate workers, those in the rural areas are more likely to
migrate. The impact of being a public employee on migration depends on education, and only
migration amongst illiterates is increased.
23
ii) Public jobs and the evolution of the provincial distribution of population
Section 3 (i) provides evidence that an increase in public sector jobs in a governorate
(province) induces in-migration.  This section explores how far this is consistent with evidence
about the evolution of provincial population levels.  We study time series evidence of whether the
distribution of public jobs has subsequently redistributed population between Egypt’s governorates.
We use a sequence of the Egyptian Population Census to estimate the effects of the location of
public jobs on the evolution of the provincial shares of population, 1986-96.  A pooled cross-section
time series model of provincial population share is estimated using as the dependent variable the
shares of provincial population, 
j S , in 1996 and 1986 for twenty-two governorates.
24 The
explanatory variables are a) the population and public job shares ten years earlier; b) the change in
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
22 However to check the robustness of our findings we also estimate disequilibrium models which include wage and
unemployment effects.  These provide very similar findings and are available from the authors on request.
23 The most likely explanation is that public jobs for illiterates tend to be short-term contracts, and that these provide on-
the-job training and information about the worker, which in the absence of formal credentials, help to secure another
public job.
24 Separate data for five “Frontier” governorates: Red Sea, El-Wadi El-Gidid, Matrouh, North Sinai and South Sinai do
not exist for 1976.  These governorates are therefore combined and treated as one geographic unit.  Thus only 22
governorates rather than 26 are used.￿
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public job shares over the intervening period. This specification allows the share of public jobs in
year t to be influenced differently by the accumulation of public jobs before (t-10), than by that in
the more recent ten year period between t and (t-10). Thus we estimate
j j j j j j e t p t p t p t S t S + - - + - + - + = )] 10 ( ) ( [ ) 10 ( ) 10 ( ) ( 3 2 1 0 b b b b
where  ) (t S
j  is the provincial share of population in period t, and  ) (t p
j is the provincial share of
public jobs in period t. Since the ‘recent’ change in public job shares ) 10 ( ) ( - - t p t p
j j , might be
thought to be partly determined by population share in  ) (t S
j , we estimate the model using
instrumental variables as well as by ordinary least squares. Sargan statistics to test for mis-
specification were found to be insignificant in both of the models
). 54 . 1 ) 2 ( : 2 ; 14 . 2 ) 2 ( : 1 (
2 2 = = c c Col Col
The results are described in Table 5.  The coefficients on both variables capturing the effects
of public sector job shares are of the correct sign, and are statistically significant.  We are unable to
reject the null hypothesis that  3 2 b b = , so that whether the public jobs were created in the 10 year
period prior to, forecast population share, or at an earlier point, is not of significance.  We can
therefore assume  3 2 b b = and collapse in the model to one with only  ) (t p
j representing the
evolution of public jobs.  Once again we estimate the model using both ordinary least squares and
by instrumenting 
25 the public sector variable,  ) (t p
j .  This is represented in columns 2 and 4 of
Table 5.  In each case the parameter estimate on  ) 86 (
j p is highly significant, with an estimated
value of about 0.5.  This implies that a 10% increase in a governorate’s share of public jobs leads to
a 5% increase in population share.  Since on average one third of jobs are in the public sector, this is
consistent with the view that three extra public jobs in a governorate increases the governorate’s
population by about five.  Since in Egypt the labor force participation rate in 1996 was 30% the￿
￿
￿
estimate suggests that ten extra governorate j public sector jobs will attract about five extra migrant
workers to governorate j, each accompanied by two dependants.  In summary, the evidence in this
Section supports the mobility evidence in Section 3 (i) that public jobs growth has influenced the
provincial allocation of labor.
4.   Why Do Governorates with Public Jobs Growth Attract Migrants?
In Section 3 we discussed evidence showing that provincial public jobs growth has attracted
migrants, and that provincial population shares have increased after being allocated public jobs.
The model in Section 2 shows how one important cause of this may be the wage premiums attached
to public jobs, which enable rural applicants to accept urban jobs that they would otherwise reject,
and induce inefficient migration. Other causes are not excluded, but of these alternatives only the
H-T model implies that this process of concentration is inefficient. In this Section we test our
explanation of why public jobs spatially concentrate the population against the alternatives.
The leading alternative hypotheses are that 1) public jobs offer wage premiums, and those
living nearby have a search advantage (H-T), and 2) public jobs create an increased demand for
local private services, which therefore expands and attracts in-migration. We shall continue to
control for the potentially efficient influence of the supply of provincial public services,  ) / (
i i N j D .
As discussed in the Appendix, Hypothesis 1 is unappealing for Egypt since public jobs requiring at
least secondary education (the majority) are centrally allocated. However, amongst the least
educated there may be migration to be near wage premium jobs as H-T speculate. Thus, to allow for
this, we shall disaggregate the analysis by educational category. The hypothesis in Section 2
emphasizes how wage premiums facilitate public sector hiring of migrants in governorates with
more public jobs. In contrast, both of the alternative hypotheses predict that the provincial growth
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
25 The instruments are listed below Table 5.  The Wu-Hausman test suggests that the exogeniety assumption is rejected￿
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of public wage premium jobs will cause in-migration to fill private as well as public jobs. Why is
this? In the H-T model, more wage premium jobs attract a larger stock of workers into low pay jobs,
some of whom eventually acquire wage premium jobs.  Hypothesis 2 proposes that governorates
with more public jobs grow because of a local multiplier effect through the demand for local
services, with no emphasis on wage premiums so that immigrants are indifferent to accepting public
and private jobs. Thus we explore migrants’ jobs at destination and examine whether the growth of
public jobs in a governorate stimulates migration to undertake public jobs, private jobs, or both. In
Section 4 (ii) we again contrast the alternative hypotheses, but by using urban wage data.
(i) Does public employment growth in a governorate attract migrants to public or private jobs?
In our model of inefficient mobility, migrants are attracted to governorates with growing
public sectors in order to accept public jobs. Migration to private jobs in a supporting service sector,
prompted by nearby public sector growth, is not inconsistent with the model but it is not part of our
argument that it occurs. In contrast both of the other hypotheses predict that the growth of wage
premium jobs prompts agglomeration by attracting migrants to unregulated nearby jobs of some
type. In the H-T model migration to low pay jobs near to an expanding wage premium sector is the
crucial mechanism whereby wage premiums prompt urbanization. We contrast these implications
by estimating a multinominal logit model that distinguishes migration flows to public and private
jobs.  The samples of illiterates and those with less than secondary education are combined since
the public hiring procedures are the same for workers in these categories.  However, because of the
centralized hiring practices for those with at least secondary education, as discussed in the
Appendix, these workers are considered separately.
The estimates in Table 6 indicate than an increase in public jobs in other governorates has a
positive highly significant impact on migration to public jobs relative to not migrating for both
educational groups. In other words, the more public jobs that are created in other governorates, the
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and that instrumental variables estimators are preferred.￿
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more likely is out-migration for all educational groups to a public sector job. However, public jobs
growth in other governorates has an insignificant impact on migration to private sector jobs relative
to not migrating, for the less educated groups, and a positive significant effect for the better
educated. Thus support for the alternative hypotheses appears to be concentrated amongst educated
workers. In Egypt, expansion of public jobs has not caused the low-waged to accumulate in nearby
private jobs. This is particularly striking since for the poorly educated a local search advantage for
public jobs might exist so that some evidence for the H-T view would not be inconsistent with the
institutional context. We have pointed out that in Egypt the more educated group has no local
search advantage for public jobs so that the effect uncovered for that group is best interpreted as
evidence for an expanding service sector attracting migratory inflow in the conventional way
(hypothesis 2).
The evidence in this section is consistent with the view that socially inefficient migration
and agglomeration are induced by public job offers with wage premiums, but is inconsistent with
the H-T claim that the prospect of premiums causes inefficient migration by low-skill workers to
nearby unregulated jobs. This is significant since it was the plight of the urban poor that provided
the primary motivation for the Harris-Todaro theory of wage premiums and agglomeration.
The role of public service provision as captured by origin-governorate public jobs per head
is not strong, although for the less educated there is some evidence that a larger public sector per
head reduces provincial out migration to public sector jobs in other governorates. The absence of a
similar effect for migration to private jobs casts doubt on the view that this strongly reflects the
utility consequences of a simple increase in the public services of the origin governorate.
The interaction effect of being illiterate and being employed in the public sector is included
in the model (cols. 1 and 2). The estimates suggest that public sector employment growth increases
the mobility of illiterates, primarily to accept other public jobs.  The effects of age and industry are
similar to those in the binomial models.￿
￿
￿
Simulations:  Table 7 shows the predicted out-migration probabilities for five types of
workers based on Table 6.  The importance of provincial public jobs growth is captured in the top
panel which compares the migration probability for five types of workers when increases in public
sector jobs in other governorates is one standard deviate greater than the provincial average, and
those when it is one standard deviate below the provincial average.  Such a change reduces
migration rates by slightly less than 50% amongst poorly educated workers, and by about 60%
amongst graduates from secondary or higher education.
The other parameter estimates give support to the specification.  The more educated are
more likely to migrate, by a factor of four.  This is very similar to findings for Colombia, where the
migration rate also rises sharply with education and is four times as high for those with higher
education as those with non – Fields (1982).  Also, our findings indicate that rural workers are more
likely to migrate between governorates than urban ones.  The rate of migration of a rural illiterate
worker is predicted to be at least twice that of an urban illiterate worker.  The rate of migration of a
rural educated worker is predicted to be four times that for an urban educated worker.
(ii) Urban private wages and the influence of jobs with wage premium
The migration evidence suggests that public wage premiums have facilitated inefficient
agglomeration by attracting workers to accept public jobs in growing regions. We now look at wage
data to explore further evidence capable of discriminating between this and the H-T view. First, we
consider the implications of each hypothesis for the relationship between the size of the public
sector and unregulated private wages in urban areas.
A basic implication of the Harris-Todaro model (Hypothesis 1), is that unregulated wages
are lower in cities with greater proportion of jobs with wage premiums, for otherwise expected
wages are not equalized across cities.
26   The model in Section 2 implies that if mobility is costless,

26 Consider the simplest version of the Harris-Todaro-Fields where city j has Gj public jobs offering wage w ,  and
there is a region with exogenous wage w and no public jobs.  If all public jobs turnover each period, and all workers in￿
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urban private wages are independent of the local proportion of high wage government jobs. If
mobility is costly, relative urban wages may rise or fall with proportion of public jobs according to
their productivity, a . 
27 The local public good aspect of government jobs reduces firms’ costs and
increases the private demand for labor (the second term in (11)). Thus in Figure 1, if 
U a is large an
increase in government jobs to governorate i may shift ll to the right, and for all initial equilibria
except v, increase labor demand and relative private wages in governorate i.  For two other reasons
the response of wages in a governorate to an increase in government jobs may be dependent upon
local phenomena. First, the sensitivity of utility to congestion may well differ between governorates
so that the slope of ll (see (12)) may differ between governorates.  Secondly, governorates may
differ in the proportion of public appointments to migrants b.  Thus, additional government jobs,
which shift ll, will change relative wages by different amounts in different governorates.
In order to explore whether these data are consistent with the H-T prediction that, in
equilibrium, unregulated wages are lower in urban areas with a larger share of public jobs we have
used individual data to estimate “Mincer” earnings equations for male private sector urban workers.
These individuals are distributed across 26 urban areas, and we use our data to calculate the
proportion of workers in government jobs, by educational group for each area.  This variable is then
used as the explanatory regressor, to capture the Harris-Todaro effect on unregulated wages.  Since
jobs for those with less than secondary education may offer local residents a search advantage, we
run separate regressions for a) university and secondary educated persons and b) those with less
than secondary education.  Within the latter group we distinguish between those who are illiterate,
can read, have completed only primary education, and have completed preparatory education.  To
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city j apply, then the probability of a public job offer, p, is Gj(Gj + Lj) where Lj is private employment in town j.  Then
in migration equilibrium  w w p w p
j j j = = - ) 1 ( .  Thus totally differentiating we have
. 0 ) 1 /( ) ( / < - - - =
j j j j p w w dp dw
27 Here private wages near public jobs fall as rural appointments to public urban jobs increase urban congestion and
reduce the urban private demand for labour private employment.  Mobility costs inhibit migration from areas congested
by more public jobs.￿
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control for variations in the urban cost of living we have added a fixed effect which takes the value
1 for Cairo, Giza and Alexandria, and value 0, otherwise.
Our main results are given in columns 1 and 3 of Table 8 and in both cases we find
insignificant and extremely small parameters, for the variable capturing the relative scale of
government jobs.  In columns 2 and 4 we have added a measure of the change in the proportion of
local jobs that are public in an attempt to capture disequilibrium effects.  The resulting parameters
are close to statistical significance but inexplicably have different signs for the two educational
groups.  We conclude that the evidence from urban wage data is inconsistent with the H-T model,
but is consistent with both the argument in Section 2, and the hypothesis that public sector jobs
encourage the conventional growth of a supporting service sector.
5. Conclusion
Many LDCs possess a unitary system of government in which central government allocates
public jobs to regions and pays a wage premium. This paper shows how, if migration is costly,
regions that receive public jobs with wage premiums experience inefficient in-migration and
employment concentration, even if these jobs do not produce local public services, and jobs are not
offered to favor local applicants. This is because governments may for reasons of patronage
distribute offers for wage premium jobs to workers who must undertake costly migration to accept
them, and are unable to trade these jobs with workers who have lower mobility costs. Although in-
migration funded by wage premiums creates urban congestion and reduces public services, the
various costs of migration from the city are sufficient for the equilibrium city size to increase, since
wage premium jobs are concentrated in certain locations.
Although both the Harris-Todaro model and the ‘frictional mobility cost’ model described in
Section 2 allow wage premiums that are unevenly distributed over space to create inefficient
employment concentration, the empirical implications and policy inferences of the models differ.
Empirical evidence from Egypt shows in Section 3 that public jobs growth has altered the pattern of￿
￿
￿
regional mobility and population shares.  However this could reflect efficient labor reallocation or
either of the models of inefficient employment concentration. Secondly, in Section 4, we show how
the theory developed in Section 2 may be tested against alternative theories of why public jobs may
cause agglomeration. The exploration of individual mobility to public and private jobs, together
with wage and regional population shares data, is supportive of our hypothesis relative to the
Harris-Todaro model. However, there is also evidence that public sector growth induces
conventional in-migration to nearby high-skill private employment.
In this model wage premiums are attached to public jobs, but wages in some sectors are also
set above competitive equilibrium levels by trade unions or for efficiency wage reasons. While the
modeling is complicated by the endogeneity of unionized or efficiency wage employment - public
employment can more easily be thought of as exogenous - the labor market equilibrium capturing
costly migration between non-rationed jobs to maximize utility has a similar structure. We therefore
conjecture that other causes of wage premiums will promote employment concentration under
similar assumptions.
Williamson (1988) has pointed out that primary cities in LDCs generally have large
population shares relative to primary cities in developing European countries in the nineteenth
century.  The evidence gathered above suggests that this may in part be explained by the scale of
public employment in primary cities, and the migration incentives provided by substantial public
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The public sector share in total employment rose from 10% to 37% during the three decades
after 1960 – see Table 1A – and by 1990 it produced almost half of GDP.
28  Public jobs are
unevenly allocated among regions, with much higher proportions of public sector employees in
urban areas – see Table 1B.  For example, in 1993 public employment accounted for 49% of total
employment in urban areas and 23% in rural areas.  Among urban areas, public jobs are also
unevenly allocated.
29  While only 32% of public employees are educated to secondary level and
above, these comprise 69% of the entire working population in this education category.
The growth of public jobs has been underpinned by an ‘employment guarantee’ which
entitled university and secondary school graduates to a public appointment two and three years after
graduation respectively, and a generous total compensation package.
30  When the growth of the
public wage bill became unsustainable in the mid 1980s, the government responded by eroding real
public wages and increasing waiting periods for jobs.
31  By 1987 blue collar workers were on
average earning the same wage rate in the public and private sectors, while white collar workers
were only earning around 67% of the private wage rate.  However, the non-pecuniary advantages of
public jobs in Egypt – health care, pension and job security – are substantial (for a careful
documentation of this, see Assaad and Commander (1994)), and excess supply to public jobs
amongst all educational groups existed throughout our period of study.
32  Amongst those with less
than secondary education, the central job allocation mechanism did not apply during 1981-8, and
there may have been incentives to live near to public jobs.  Public appointments are centrally
coordinated by the Ministry of Manpower which reviews applications from eligible graduates and
invites requests from government agencies and enterprises for graduate employees.  Since the
agencies and enterprises are provided with funding for appointments, demand exceeds supply.
Graduates are not necessarily matched to jobs in governorates in which they are resident.  Apart
from certain specified categories (medical doctors and teachers), public agencies have only been
allowed to hire graduates through this system, although in 1978 public enterprises were allowed to
opt out, and to select their own hiring levels and employees – Hansen and Radwan (1982).

28 Between 1960 and 1976, while the rate of growth of Egypt’s labour force was 2.2%, that of public employment was
7.5%.  Egypt: Human Development Report 1995.
29 For example, in 1986 (1993), public employment as a percentage of total employment was 45.5 (48.3) in Cairo, 21.6
(29.2) in Damietta and 18.1 (26.7) in Fayoum - Egypt: Human Development Report 1994 and 1995.
30 Similar systems for public appointments are in place in other LDCs – for example, Ethiopia.  The waiting period
allowed males to complete military service.  In 1973 the employment guarantee was extended to demobilized military
with lower educational qualifications, but this was withdrawn in 1976.  The guarantee stimulated the demand for
secondary and university education, which in turn, increased applications for public employment.
31 See Assaad (1997).  The wage structure was also compressed by increasing wages at the lower end while restraining
the wages of the more skilled, Said (1996).
32 In addition to the basic wages, workers can receive allowances for hazardous work, accommodation, and various
other aspects of the job.  The sum total of allowances and incentives is limited to 100% of the basic wage (Assaad
1997).  Zaytoun’s (1991) analysis of the earnings differential also reveals that private sector workers in general earn
higher wages than public sector workers, and that this differential is substantial for white-collar employees.  Assaad and
Commander (1994) point out that the public sector is the preferred employer, not for the wage reasons but for a
combination of status, security and benefits such as free medical care and priority access to subsidized goods and
services.Table 1A
  Employment by sector in Egypt
Year Public Sector (PS) Private Sector Urban Population*
Thous % of Total
Employment
Thous % of  Total
Employment
Thous % of Total
Pop
1947
1 310 4.4 6685 95.6 6363 33.5
1960
1 770 10.0 6957 90.0 9965 38.2
1970
2 1300 15.7 6975 84.3 na na
1976/77
3 2958 31.1 6536 68.9 16037 43.8
1981/82
3 3851 33.6 7908 66.4 na na
1986/87
3 4794 35.8 8589 64.2 21216 44.0
1989/90
3 5275 36.6 9125 63.4 na na
1995
4 5308 34.9 9900 65.1 na na
Notes:   Data on urban population are only available for population census years.
The public sector comprises four main categories: central and local government, public
authorities and public enterprises.
Sources:
1Mabro (1974) pp.209-210.
2 Abdel-Fadil (1980) p.6.
3Egypt: Human Development Report 1995, p.35.
4Assaad (1997) pp. 85-118.
 Table  1B
The location and educational structure of public jobs
Working Region  PS Jobs as a % of  Total
Employment in 1981
 PS Jobs as a % of  Total
Employment in 1988
Greater Cairo 44.35 46.00
Alex & Canal Cities 44.96 43.87
Lower Urban 38.57 41.65
Upper Urban 41.77 44.54
Lower Rural 12.75 13.95
Upper Rural 14.59 16.87
All Regions 30.27 32.17
Educational Level in 1988  Distribution (%) of PS Jobs by
Educational Group
 Distribution (%) of Educational
Group Working in PS
No education 13.60 10.83
Less than Secondary
1 54.53 39.17
Secondary & University 31.87 69.23
1Less than primary, primary and preparatory schooling
Note: The data for Table 1B is drawn from the 1988 LFSS, which as can be seen, gives us a lower
estimate for the share of Public Sector employment for both, 1981 & 1988 than Table 1A.Table 2A













Age (Mean) ----- 35.9 33.2 38.6
Age Groups
5  (%)
15-21 9.47 5.91 22.98 16.36
22-26 15.59 19.89 27.02 15.19
27-34 13.61 37.63 24.19 21.61
35-44 8.78 24.70 11.69 19.45
45-54 4.63 8.06 6.45 15.26
55-64 6.18 3.76 7.66 9.59
Educational Level (%)
No education 8.1 20.97 41.94 40.39
Less than Secondary
6 9.7 40.86 45.96 44.80
Secondary & University 15.5 38.17 12.10 14.81
Economic Activity (%)
Agriculture 5.3 19.89 16.53 33.60
Manufacturing 9.6 8.06 20.56 15.67
Construction 27.1 10.75 21.77   6.22
Services & Others 11.1 61.30 58.86 44.51
Public Jobs in 1981 (%) 11.0 56.99 16.13 30.27
Origin Working Region (%)
Greater Cairo 14.8 35.48 36.29 23.99
Alex & Canal Cities  9.6   8.06 10.48   9.73
Lower Urban 9.4 13.98 11.69 13.35
Upper Urban  3.5   2.15   4.84 10.52
Lower Rural 8.7 27.42 18.95 25.56
Upper Rural  9.2 12.90 17.74 16.86
Sample Size --- 186 248 4390
1  Migrants per 100 persons in the seven year period, 1981- 88.
2 Distribution of migrants to public sector jobs by category.
3  Distribution of migrants to private sector jobs by category.
4  Distribution of whole sample by characteristic.
5 Age in 1985.
6 Less than primary, primary and preparatory schooling.
Source: 1988 LFSS.Table 2B


















106 1199 40 130 146 1329
Private Sector
Employment in 1981
80 207 208 2854 288 3061
Total Employment in
1981
186 1406 288 2984 434 4390
Source: 1988 LFSS.
Notes:
1 The number of Public Sector employees in 1988 who have migrated (moved between governorates)
between 1981 & 1988.
2Total number of Public Sector employees in 1988.Table 3
Definitions of the explanatory variables
VARIABLE DEFINITION
1. Public Sector (PS)
PS Employee in 1981 = 1 if employed in the public sector in 1981
PS Employee * Illiterate = 1 if employed in the public sector in 1981 and illiterate
Increase in  PS Jobs in OTHER
governorates
Increase in public sector jobs (by educational group) in other
governorates, 1981-1988
Increase in public services in OWN
governorate per employee
Increase in public service jobs in own governorate, 1981-1988, as a
percentage of total employment in own governorate in 1981
2. Educational Levels
Illiterate No education
Less than Secondary Primary and preparatory education
Secondary & Above Secondary and university degrees
3.  Regional Dummies ( Greater Cairo is the reference group)
Alex & Canal Cities =1 if working in Alexandria or Canal Cities in 1981
Lower Urban =1 if working in Lower Urban in 1981
Upper Urban =1 if working in Upper Urban in 1981
Lower Rural =1 if working in Lower Rural in 1981
Upper Rural =1 if working in Upper Rural in 1981
4. Industry Dummies (Services are the reference group)
Agriculture =1 if employed in the agriculture sector in 1981
Manufacturing =1 if employed in the manufacturing sector in 1981
Construction =1 if employed in the construction sector in 1981Table 4
  Logit models of the probability of governorate out-migration
Variables Illiterates Less than Secondary Secondary & Above






































































































































































Rural (Lower + Upper) ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -1.92
(-4.51)
Industry Dummies





























Log-Likelihood -438.56 -439.44 -574.15 -534.37 -251.58 -242.01
Chi-Squared 117.04 115.29 100.88 180.47 58.36 77.50
DF 16 10 16 15 17 11
Total Sample 1773 1773 1967 1967 650 650
No of  migrants 143 143 190 190 101 101
t-statistics are in parentheses        Reference group: 27-34 years old, Greater Cairo & other industries (services). Table 5
 The determination of  governorate  population shares (
j










lagged ten years  (
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Share of Governorate PS Jobs
lagged ten years (
j






Increase in Share of Governorate












































Sample Size 44 44 44 44
R
2 ---- ---- 0.87 0.89
Generalized R
2 0.87 0.89 ---- ----
Wu – Hausman Test ---- ---- F (1, 36) = 4.97 F (1,37) = 3.51
t-statistics are in parentheses
Note:
* Alexandria and Canal Cities are the reference group.
a)  Census Data for 1960,1976, 1986 and 1996 are used.
b)  In  column 1,  increase in share of Public Sector jobs 
j
t p - 
j
t p 10 -  is instrumented out.  In column 2,
share of Public Sector jobs in 1986 and 1996 
j
t p is instrumented out.  The following variables are
used as instruments: population share in 1960 and 1976; percentage rural workers 1976 and1986;
dummies for rural regions; literacy rate by region; share of public sector jobs, lagged ten years.
c)  The Wu - Hausman’s statistic test was used to test for exogeneity of the regressors and the
disturbance term. The test rejects the null hypothesis that that the OLS estimates are consistent.
Thus, to get a consistent estimator we use instrumental variable (IV) estimation.Table  6










































































































































Chi-Squared (DF ) 365.57 (32) 96.35 (22)
Total Sample 3740 650
No of migrants 115,    218 71,    30
t-statistics are in parentheses.    Reference group: 27-34 years old, Greater Cairo & other industries (services).Table 7
 Predicted probabilities of inter-governorate migration
A B C D E
Illiterates Educated
Reference Group for that governorate 0.012 0.037 0.073 0.040 0.169
Increase in PS Jobs in other governorates
equal to mean minus 1 standard
deviation for relevant educational  group
0.008 0.024 0.048 0.024 0.102
Increase in PS Jobs in other governorates
equal to mean plus 1 standard deviation
for relevant educational group
0.013 0.042 0.084 0.058 0.243
A: Illiterate, between 27-34 years old, working in Upper Urban, in the services industry and in the
private sector in 1981. Increase in PS jobs in other governorates equal to the national average mean for
illiterates. Wages in the private sector and unemployment equal to national average unless otherwise
indicated.
B: As A  but working in Lower Urban.
C: As A but in Upper Rural.
D: Educated (secondary or higher), between 27-34 years old, working in Lower Urban, in the services
industry and in the private sector in 1981. Increase in PS jobs in other regions equal to the national
average mean for the educated. Wages in the private sector and unemployment equal to national
average unless otherwise indicated.
E: As D but working in Upper Rural.Table 8
 Estimates of ln earnings of males in private urban employment; 1988
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Change in Public Sector Jobs as




































N 1612 1612 771 771
R
2 0.384 0.385 0.411 0.413
Adj. R
2 0.382 0.382 0.407 0.408
1 Illiterates are the reference group for less than secondary, and university graduates are the reference
group for secondary and university.
2 Cairo, Giza and Alexandria are the cosmopolitan reference group in which the price level is likely to
be greater.F
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